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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
MARINUS JOHNSON and 
ARLIN DAVIDSON, 
vs. 
DUKE PAGE, JOSEPH KOYLE 
and .fOE SYRETT, 
Defendants. 
CASE 
NO. ___ _ 
Brief of Appellant, Duke Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case was previously appealed to the Utah Supreme 
Court by the appellant from a decision of the District Court 
of Juab County. From the appeal the Supreme Court re-
versed the District Court and among other things stated 
that the joint venture did exist, was not terminated, and 
that a division of the property of the joint venture must 
follow the contract upon termination of the venture. . The 
Supreme Court stated "Therefore Page and Johnson each 
own one-half interest in the property, Page to be reimbursed 
one-half of all his expenditures in the acquiring and pre-
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serving of the property, which would include the cost of 
buying and moving the house upon the land to complete 
the patent to Mrs. Pratt, taxes and filing fees. Since the 
joint venture continued until terminated by the trial court's 
decree, Page is not entitled to interest upon the investment 
and variation of the contract which provides for such ad-
vances. Reversed and remanded for findings and conclu-
sions not inconsistent with this opinion." 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FURNISlllNG THE 
DEFENDANT, DUKE PAGE, WITH FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN THE ABOVE 
CASE. 
POINT 2 
THE COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING AND DIS-
SOLVING THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES, EXCEPT 
AS FIXED BY THE TERMS OF ITS DECREE. 
POINT 3 
THAT THlE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING 
THE DEFENDANT, PAGE, COSTS ON APPEAL IN 
THE AMOUNT OF $187.53. 
POINT 4 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN CALCULATING 
THE AMOUNT OF EXPENDITURES MADE BY THE 
DEFENDANT, PAGE, IN ACQUIRING AND PRESERV-
ING THE PROPERTY, FOR WHICH AMOUNT HE 
SHOULD HlAVE JUDGMENT. 
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THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FURNISHING THE 
DEFENDANT, DUKE PAGE, WITH FINDINGS OF 
FACf AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN THE ABOVE 
CASE. 
Rule 52 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require the 
court to find the facts specifically and state separately its 
conclusion of law. The court in this case merely served a 
copy of the judgment upon the defendant, Page. I might 
add that it would appear that the judgment was prepared 
by the court and not by either of the parties. The court 
rejected two different sets of findings submitted by the de-
fendant, Page. 
POINT 2 
TH~ COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING AND DIS-
SOLVING THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES, EXCEPT 
AS FIXED BY THE TERMS OF ITS DECREE. 
The court has no right to terminate the relative rights 
of the parties under the contract of May 1, 1940. If John-
son has the right to benefit equally from the joint venture 
agreement and if it existed until the time it was terminated 
by action of the court then, ergo, the defendant Page had 
an equal right to share in the profits that the plaintiff, John-
son, has received . from his dealing with property covered. 
by the contract of May 1, 1940. 
The fact is that the record discloses that the defendant, 
Johnson, sold a portion of the property to the defendant, 
Davidson. The defendant, Johnson, merely had a joint right 
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to the property but did not own an undivided one-half in-
terest which he could sell as a tenant in common. 
The defendant, Page, has sued the plaintiffs, Johnson 
and Davidson, for an accounting of the profits made by 
Johnson from land acquired subject to the joint venture 
agreement and the court should not enter a judgment 
couched in such terms as would preclude the action of Page 
or be res adjudica to the pursuit of his rights thereunder. 
The plaintiffs in this action have in their defense to that 
action pleaded this judgment for that purpose. 
It is the contention of the appellant that neither party 
proceeded in the trial court under the theory that the other 
had any rights under the original contract. The suit now 
pending between the parties is based upon the decision of 
this Court and its interpretation of the respective rights 
of the parties. 
The claim of the appellant against the plaintiffs is 
brought under a claim independent of that originally sued 
upon in this suit. He should not be barred from asserting 
such a claim by over-inclusive language of the court. At 
the most the Court should restrict itself to terminating the 
joint venture and adjudicating the rights under the issues 
joined by the pleadings, but it has no right in stating ''the 
rights of the parties thereunder are terminated except to 
the extent fixed by the terms of this decree." This is one 
of those instances where neither party by their original 
theories intended a counterclaim by the other, each claim-
ing an exclusive right to the 400 acres which was the sub-
ject of this law suit. 
We believe that the right the appellant is now assert-
ing is one of those rights that is optional or permissive for 
the appellant to claim at the time. In the altemativ,e it cer-
' 
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tainly is one of those rights that justice should require not 
be foreclosed. 
It would appear that the court has gone far beyond the 
instruction of the Supreme Court to the trial court upon the 
first hearing of this cause, and certainly exceeds require-
ments of the decree. 
Why should the appellant be precluded from bringing 
an action for an accounting on property obtained by appel-
lees whi·ch rights the appellant was unaware of at the or-
iginal trial? 
Actually, the appellant's claim against the appellees 
involves property foreign to that sued upon by the plaintiffs. 
It is a new claim that might properly have been asserted 
as a permissive counterclaim had the appellant thought the 
original contract had not been rescinded. When the Court 
determined that a joint venture did exist then his rights 
became apparent, however, the language of the lower court 
would tend to bar them. 
It also has the effect of placing upon the appellant the 
duty of having this Court rule upon the right to bring a suit 
upon a subject matter related but not arising out of the 
transaction which was the subject of the instant case. This 
point, of course, is the most important point in the appel 
-lant's case and is of vital concern to the appellant. 
The appellant has not submitted authority on the ques-
tion of res judicata for reason that to do so the appellant 
would have had to show to the Court the facts of an entirely 
new case which was not in evidence in the case below. 
The question here would seem to be one of equity and 
justice and hy context of Rule 13-B, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the annotations thereunder it would appear 
v 
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that the Legislature and the courts do not desire to fore-
close a counter-right ex:cept in those cases wherein the coun-
terclaim is a necessary element of the same suit and can 
be proved or disproved by the same fact situation. 
In any event how, and why, should the trial court 
attempt to pre-judge or bar any other rights, the nature of 
which are unknown to him. The court's language is much 
broader than that necessary to decide the issues of the case. 
POINT 3 
THAT THIE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING 
THE DEFENDANT, PAGE, COSTS ON APPEAL IN 
THE AMOUNT OF $187.53. 
The appellant filed a cost bill within the time allotted 
after the remittitur was returned, but by oversight failed 
to include the cost of the transcript in the amount of $91.75. 
Subsequently, the appellant filed an amended cost bill show-
ing appellant's actual cost in the amount of $187.53; how-
ever, the court awarded the appellant only $55.28 costs but 
awarded the plaintiffs $10.00 cost of trial. Naturally the 
appellant is aggrieved. 
If the cost bill has been filed within the proper time, 
the court certainly should allow the filing of a supplemental 
amended cost bill. See Dignan vs. Nelson, 26 Utah, 186, 72 
P. 936. 
POINT 4 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN CALCULATING 
THE AMOUNT OF EXPENDITURES MADE BY THE 
DEFENDANT, PAGE, IN ACQUIRING AND PRESERV-
ING THE PROPERTY, FOR WHICH AMOUNT HE 
SHOULD HAVE JUDGMENT. 
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The appellant asked the court to determine that the 
appellant, Page, was entitled to be reimbursed for one-half 
the following expenditures which are shown in the tran-
script: 
"a. Mrs. William Pratt, _$440.00. ~ 
b. Eli Taylor, $65.00. t~\ 
c. Recording fees incident to patent, $~ .. 10. o '-
d. Entry on States selection, $10.00. o<.. 
e. Survey and engineering costs on entire prop-
erty, $120.00. 
f. Taxes for years 1944 to 1954, inclusive, $165.02. 
g. Costs of houses and building placed on prop-
erty, $400.00. JSV t:~J ": 
h. Eli Taylor for legal fees in connection with the 
property, $176.00. 
i. LeRoy Hill, wages for moving houses, $180.00. 
j. Eldon Otteson for groceries on project, $40.00. 
k. Advance to Marinus Johnson, $170.00. 
1. Utah County Implement cost for dead horse, 
$150.00. 
m. Advance to Marin us Johnson, $22.87. 
n. J. W. Jones for survey on entire property, 
$225.00. 
o. Killpack Service Company for gas and oil in 
moving house, $15.40. 
p. Advance to Marin us Johnson, $22.87. 
q. Central Market for groceries on project, $80.34. 
r. Advance to Marinus Johnson, $35.45. 
s. Chase Lumber Company for lumber for house, 
$85.00. 
t. LeRoy Hill bonus on moving house, $30.00." 
Total: $2,436.05. 
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The expenditures shown are substantiated by testimony 
and evidence shown in the transcript, and should have been 
allowed. It is contended that the Court has refused to fol-
low the instruction of the Court in that he has failed to make 
a finding of such costs as were made by appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues in this appeal are merely questions of inter-
pretation of facts requiring no legal authority. It is respect-
fully submitted that the trial court has misinterpreted the 
instruction of this Court, and has not entered judgment ac-
cordingly. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL J. MERRILL 
JACKSON B. HOWARD 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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